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support and had only a limited effect upon Nkrumah's fellow African leaders. Its only obvious result was the financial burden it placed on the economy.

Kenyatta, on the other hand, has moved in exactly the opposite direction. His efforts have been directed against a cult of personality and toward the cultivation of popular rather than devotional support. Throughout, there has been a gradual attempt to establish ministerial rather than personal responsibility. Consistent with this has been Kenyatta's policy of avoiding those courses of action that are flamboyant, self-aggrandizing or charismatic, but not in the best interest of Kenya's internal development. His avoidance of deep involvement in African nationalist adventures is suggestive of this.

CONCLUSION

With this description our African model is complete. The basic argument is a simple one: To realize the promise of the revolutionary ideal, African leaders must build citizens and not merely states and economies, and to these citizens they must guarantee individual

liberties as well as material advances. To do this charismatic leadership is no longer required, and the attempt to maintain such authority will only result in oppression, reaction and further revolution. It seems evident that Kenyatta recognizes this, and is leading Kenya toward a form of rational-legal polity; Nkrumah does not, and has already paid the full price for his error. The lesson is obvious. African leaders facing problems of social and economic development cannot possibly meet them through a charismatic appeal. Their solution requires routinization and legalization, not transcendence. In moving from oxcart to steel mill, men must acquire the imagination necessary to control a changing environment.⁶⁰ In this process simply following the leader is no longer enough; men must now share in power and initiative if they are to learn. In the last analysis, charismatic leadership may make men free but it cannot make them citizens.

⁶⁰ See C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN NATION-BUILDING

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ABSTRACT

A better understanding of the present situation in sub-Saharan Africa may be gained by comparison with analogous developments in Europe. The role of absolutism in nation-building is paralleled by the Colonial period, the European nation-state by the emergent nations of the post-Colonial period. Three types of nationalism can be distinguished in European history: (a) demotic nationalism which aims at homogenizing culturally heterogeneous populations included arbitrarily into political units according to democratic principles, (b) ethnic nationalism aiming at the inclusion of each major ethnic society into one state of its own, and (c) restorative nationalism which advocates the autonomy and ultimately independence of formerly independent political units now submerged into larger political structures. Demotic tendencies in African nationalism may be recognized among leaders bent upon the building of a new nation within the given boundaries of Colonial administrative units according to the Western democratic model. Pan-Africanism on the other hand appears to be a type of ethnic nationalism while restorative tendencies find their expression in tribalism. On the basis of this comparison and past experiences in European nation-building seven hypotheses are presented regarding the relevance of the ethnic factor in nationalist ideologies and policies.

Problems of nation-building confront sociologists with particular difficulties of conceptualization and terminology. This has its historical reasons. For as an empirical

science sociology has been designed in the first place for the study of contemporary or "modern" society in a Western setting. Thus sociologists find it not easy to visualize an

unfolding of the so-called new nations which is not already chalked out in Western traditions. Yet we are in no way sure whether many of these new nations will ever become fully developed nations, or whether the process of nation-building will take place within the political boundaries existing at the moment. Instead of identifying ourselves with a particular political idea, we should rather ask under which conditions it is most likely to materialize. We also should be more sensitive to developments which may result in structures of quite a different kind yet to be conceptualized sociologically and properly named.

When it comes to discovering trends in hitherto uncharted situations the method germane to sociology is the comparative. This does not imply, however, that we should be content with superficial similarities or analogies. For history never repeats itself. Comparative sociology rather proceeds on the assumption that elementary processes and relationships, which can be distinguished analytically in the unique phenomena of history, do occur over and over again in typical combinations and sequences. Thus, what we propose to do in the present paper, is investigate how the sociological analysis of nation-building in Europe, which presumably has run its course, can assist us in understanding nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in countries formerly under British rule.

NATION-BUILDING IN EUROPE

In this attempt we are, however, handicapped by the fact that the very term "nation" is not germane to sociology. Nor is the "nation" clearly distinguished from either the "state" or the "society." By-and-large, sociologists will probably agree that the most typical empirical referent of the analytical key concept "society" is a modern nation as defined territorially by a sovereign state. This fits the assumption that global societies represent "social systems" which are sufficiently permanent and self-contained to serve as isolated units of observation. While such a simplification may be useful when constructing theoretical models for the study of intra-societal phenomena, it is misleading when the boundaries of societies themselves are in dispute. In ordinary language, too, the word "nation" is far from unequivocal: We may

think of nothing more sophisticated than a modern state and/or its population; or else of a viable global society politically organized in such a state; or even just of a society aspiring to a nation-state of its own. Yet modern states rarely include but one national society. Moreover democratic institutions often conceal the fact that the participation of large sections of the people in national affairs is rather fictitious. Accordingly, what is perceived as a nation may be confined to those sections of the people which actively support the nation-state; for instance, a dominant class or a charter population distinguished by language, religion or in some other way, and to whom the state seems to "belong" in a specific manner.¹ This goes to show that we have to be very careful in defining the problem.

Nation-building in the present context will be viewed as a process of social change culminating in a historical type of politically organized society, viz., the modern nation. Thus the process of nation-building is conceived as moving toward an ideal goal, set and rationalized by an ideology (or rather, political myth) called "nationalism" of which several varieties can be distinguished. The basic meaning of "nation" can best be explicated by describing the *genesis of the nation-state*. It grew out of the absolute monarchies of Modern History. What lay before them is often described rather vaguely as feudalism. This is not a very appropriate word for all that which antedates the emergence of the modern state and of modern society, for the feudal order is based on a hierarchy of personal allegiances and on territorial possessions held under the conditions that services be rendered to an overlord. Other historical developments have a far more direct bearing on nation-building. Much in the same way as certain political structures of native Africa, the kingdoms of the early Middle Ages in Europe consisted of people who recognized as their legitimate rulers a particular kinship group, a royal clan or dynasty. The kings, in order to stabilize their power over the heterogeneous populations of their territorial possessions, cre-

¹For a more detailed analysis of the term "nation" see Emerich Francis, *Ethnos and Demos: Soziologische Beiträge zur Volkstheorie*. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965), pp. 69-87.

ated a dependent corps of administrators and judges on the one hand, and a system of enduring institutions on the other.² They thus laid the foundations of the modern state, although the social substratum of these kingdoms was as yet not a "nation" in any sociologically meaningful sense of the word but a plurality of traditionalistic and closed "tribal" societies, among which often one "tribe" gained precedence.³ We intend to discuss the meaning of the word "tribe" later in connection with traditionalistic societies in sub-Saharan Africa.

Next we shall take up the question of how, under the influence of absolutism, the modern territorial state developed into the nation-state. Three factors require attention: a typical relationship between the ruler and the ruled, rational government, and its levelling effect upon society. With regard to the first point, it will suffice to recall that the absolute monarch represented an "alien," coercive and thus despotic will which—from the outside, as it were—manipulated the people of a given territory as well as the variety of collectivities in which they were socially organized, so as to achieve a maximum benefit for the state. Second, a centralized bureaucracy assured the efficient coordination of complex and large-scale social processes. Third, because a rational economy required individuals to be freely available and interchangeable, traditional social barriers were broken down, and ever wider portions of society were mobilized. And because a rational state administration is inclined to deal directly with individual subjects, intermediary units like family and clan, town and manor, occupational guilds and regional collectivities tended to lose their functional significance.⁴ Cultural variety and ethnic plural-

² Cf. Josef R. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), *Nation-Building* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 17-26.

³ Vestiges of "tribal" units of this kind persisted in the peasant infrastructure of European society far into the period of its "modernization."

⁴ The incorporation of these intermediary units into the bureaucratic communication network and chain of command has been impossible for two reasons. The first one is the "deviant" orienta-

ism, which often had been praised as the boon and pride of principalities, now came to be regarded as irksome obstacles to the efficiency and prosperity of the state.

TYPES OF NATIONALISM

The same classes whose modernization had been aided by the absolutistic state, prepared its transformation into the nation-state. When they assumed power in the name of the whole people (or nation), they neither changed the basic structure of the administrative state nor did they question its territorial boundaries. Their main concern was rather the proper relationship between the ruled and those exercising actual power, by freeing the ruled from the rule of a despotic will. The sovereignty of the people was to replace the sovereignty of the princes, "alien" rule was to yield to self-rule. These principles, however, could not be realized unless a reasonably homogeneous and culturally integrated society, comprising the whole population or at least a significant part of it, provided the ground for the formation of a general will. Therefore, nationalism tended to intensify the process initiated under absolutism of homogenizing culturally and ethnically all the people included in a given state. The basic type of nationalism just outlined, which is closely akin to both liberalism and democracy, may be called "radical" or *demotic nationalism*, and "demos" the type of national society which it tries to realize.

Two other types of nationalism emerged in opposition to the political and cultural effects of demotic nationalism. Neither of them was primarily concerned with the principle of self-determination within a given state or with national sovereignty without. On the contrary, they challenged the sovereignty of existing states, and demanded collective self-determination for entities which as yet had no actual political existence. Whereas in Germany

tion of these units: Their amalgamation with the bureaucracy would have implied in fact their material destruction. Otherwise the line from the state to its subjects would have been "broken" in a problematic manner: The power of the state would have been filtered and (so) restricted by the various intermediary units. In this case there would not have been any absolutism properly speaking.

or Italy—the weakness of a multitude of small territorial states was clearly demonstrated by the impressive might of a demotically conceived nation like France, patriots tried to achieve strength through union by appealing to symbols which suggest common origin and descent. This type of nationalism advanced the principle that nations, whose identity was indicated primarily by linguistic and (often enough spurious) cultural affinities, should be organized into a single nation-state. Since “nation” in this sense refers primarily to real or imagined ethnic societies, we shall speak of *ethnic nationalism*.

Finally, a third type of nationalism requires our attention. Here the term “nation” was applied to formerly independent kingdoms which had been submerged in super-national and multi-ethnic political structures. The restoration of such administrative units was usually initiated (but rarely completed) by conservative forces, such as an aristocracy or clergy, who supported their claims to power by adopting national arguments and symbols of both the ethnic and the demotic type. In this case we shall speak of “regional” or *restorative nationalism*. It goes without saying that the types of nationalism which we have distinguished analytically are actually found in manifold combinations.⁵

AFRICAN PARALLELS

We are now prepared to turn to African parallels.⁶ The *transitional stage of nationalism*, which we have linked to absolutism in Europe, corresponds to the Colonial stage in sub-Saharan Africa. In both cases the nucleus of a future nation has been preformed, and its political boundaries have been predetermined, by an administrative unit ruled by an “alien” will. Viewed from the standpoint of the native population of a British colony, for in-

stance, the Parliament of Westminster, although democratically representing the general will of the English nation, exercised precisely the same kind of despotic rule as the absolute monarchs of a future nation has been preformed, and of the *ancien régime*. More Colonial features are remindful of absolutism. Besides alien rule colonialism also meant territorial unification, intensified communication and transportation throughout the territory, rational administration and a set of common institutions with their key positions manned by the emissaries of a Colonial power and their local collaborators. Experiences of this kind led to an awareness of a common destiny, even to a sense of identity, although different sections of the population were affected in varying degrees. Colonialism thus formed a new “Colonial” society out of mobilized elements of traditional society, and transformed the traditional or tribal societies which were included in the territory. Yet these processes cannot be properly described without first analyzing the pre-Colonial situation.

We cannot expect to find equally striking similarities between the pre-Colonial and early Colonial stages in Africa and the pre-national stage in Europe. For the nation is not a cultural universal but a historical type linked to a definite period of Western civilization and spreading from there. Nevertheless basic elements of social structure can be discerned both in Europe and Africa also before the Age of Discoveries. *Tribalism* and traditionalism are widely assumed to have prevailed in the pre-Colonial situation. Yet, what precisely is to be understood by these terms? For our purposes it will suffice to point out that the cohesion and solidarity of so-called traditionalistic societies, whether in Europe or in Africa, are based in the last analysis on common descent: Their social structure consists of clans, families and other kinship groups, while the largest unit found in a traditionalistic setting, as a rule vaguely defined and loosely organized, has aptly been called an *ethnie* or *ethnos*. Identification with an ethnos comes essentially from a belief in a common origin as manifested by a variety of symbols such as geographic location, deities and cults, above all however by mutually intelligible vernacular languages and by cultural affinities.

⁵Not only have demotic nations like the French been reinterpreted later in ethnic terms but also nation-states founded on ethnic principles like Germany have used demotic arguments when it came to integrate populations of foreign ethnic origin into the nation-state.

⁶I am grateful to my assistant, Mr. Dominic Agyeman from Ghana, for numerous suggestions concerning current social conditions in former British West-Africa.

It would be wrong to assume, as is sometimes done, that all that which has been called rather indiscriminately a *tribe* necessarily represents a pristine ethnic society. Frequently enough so-called tribes are complex political units welded together out of a plurality of various types of descent groups. Thus we ought to distinguish different kinds of "tribes," and establish a proper relation between them and the ethnos. First, we find native kingdoms like those of the Yoruba, Ashanti, Bacongo or Baganda which, in more than one respect, resemble the early kingdoms of Medieval Europe. Here a secondary ethnic unification has been achieved under the auspices of a dominant tribe, and cultural integration has so far advanced, that to us they appear as demotic units. Second, there are elaborate structures which are genuinely feudal in type and capable of politically organizing a variety of ethnic elements without destroying their identity, as among the Hausa-Fulani of Nigeria or the Bariba of Dahomey. Third, "tribes" have also been called politically undifferentiated and rather "primitive" societies which, as a rule, are comparatively small and ethnically quite homogeneous such as the various Ibo tribes and many others. Following Wallerstein,⁷ politically organized tribes shall be called "tribal societies," politically undifferentiated tribes, however, "tribal communities."

While tribal societies do have political institutions which, though they may be activated but intermittently, nevertheless impart to them the character of distinct political entities, the ethnos is really a social relationship of quite a different order. This is strikingly shown by Evans-Pritchard in his description of the Nuer in the Sudan: "The whole Nuer people form a single community, territorially unbroken with common culture and feeling of exclusiveness," but "there is no common political organization or central administration."⁸ The mere fact that several tribal societies and/or communi-

ties are supposed to be related through common descent has in itself no necessary political relevance whatsoever. An ethnos as such has no political organs. Furthermore, the notion that an ethnos should form one politically organized society is neither universal nor obvious. What in Europe has been styled "national awakening," is in large part the process of activating a latent ethnos by making it aware of its political potentialities. It is of course also true that common ethnicity makes it easier to arouse a sense of solidarity, of common destiny, of common interest, of common purpose. It also makes it easier to mobilize people for military or political action in order to serve common values, improve the common lot, fulfill a common mission which may not be "ethnic" at all, but perhaps moral or religious, or "cultural" in some other meaning of the word.⁹

From the foregoing follows that mere resistance against conquest and foreign domination does not constitute nationalism. For in the specific sense given to the term here, "nationalism" refers to political aspirations concerning the relationship of a modern society and the modern state. As we have seen, the emergence of the modern state in Europe was itself part of the modernization process. The structural requirements of the administrative state initiated the formation of a large-scale homogeneous society within its boundaries, which in turn was the condition of nation-building. Demotic nationalism continued the process to the extent that the society politically organized in the nation-state can be said to be

⁹ The political significance of the ethnos can best be understood by comparison with the class struggle. The fact that a definite status is assigned to a plurality of individuals does not make them a social class in the sociological sense, that is to say, a collectivity or a social movement. In order to activate social classes, an awareness of common interests is needed. In addition, those assigned to certain status categories must realize that these interests can be best served by common effort. Moreover, there must be leaders and action groups who in the first place perceive a social category as a collectivity united by a common destiny, who make those concerned aware of it and who show them how, through uniting their efforts, they can achieve their common purpose.

⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, 1 (1962), pp. 129-139.

⁸ E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Nuer of the Sudan," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 279.

ideal-typically coterminous with the nation. Countervailing national aspirations aimed mainly at the redefinition of national boundaries according to ethnic criteria or at the restoration of submerged political structures.

THE NATION-BUILDING FUNCTION
OF COLONIAL SOCIETY

With this in mind we shall now ask how the transformation of pre-Colonial society and the formation of a new Colonial society under the impact of colonialism have activated various types of nationalism. By-and-large, colonialism had left intact political units that had existed in pre-Colonial times but had adapted the functions and character of tribal authorities to the needs of rational administration. Since no suitable partners could be found in politically as yet undifferentiated tribes, however, novel forms of political organization were imposed upon them, patterned after those which had been found workable among tribes already politically organized. Thus in the "native" or rural areas modernizing influences reached primarily the chiefs who were recognized or installed by Colonial administrators. Together with their kin and staff they formed a (partially new) tribal elite linking the rural folk with urban society.¹⁰

Colonial society emerged from the masses of tribal people who moved to the new urban centers created by colonialism. The process by which they adapted to modern conditions is remindful of urbanization in Europe, in the course of which rural folk of differing ethnic origin—after a period of intense disorganization and human suffering—were finally inte-

grated in the new national society. Alongside the masses of Africans, who were gradually urbanized and in part detribalized, another type of elite developed. The principal mechanism by which traditionalistic people everywhere are integrated into modern society, and by which modern society itself is being homogenized sufficiently to become a nation, is education in the specific Western sense of the term.¹¹ Education was also the principal channel of social mobility in Colonial society, and the *non-tribal* elite were recruited from among the educated. Accordingly, what we have called "Colonial society" comprised as its core proletarian masses and the educated elite concentrated in the new urban centers. Peripherally and intermittently it also extended to the more educated members of the tribal elite.

Colonial society was to become the nucleus of the emerging nation, for African nationalism resulted from the interplay of the new masses and the new elite responding to conditions created by colonialism and to ideologies spread by Western education. It tended to assume the characteristics of demotic nationalism for several reasons. In the first place, this was the type prevailing in Western countries which were most influential in the colonies. Furthermore, according to the prevailing system of international relations, the modern state represents the dominant unit of action. Finally, the international status of the state depends *ceteris paribus* on the efficiency of its organization. The initial aims of African nationalism were liberation and Africanization. These involved, above all, international recognition of the colony as a sovereign state as well as replacing alien rulers and manning key positions in existing institutions with natives. But national movements require popular support, a national elite needs a constituency, and a nation-state implies a nation. Thus to the national elite of *évolués* fell the task of activating the people of a given colony, making them aware of their own political relevance, arous-

¹⁰ Similar processes can be discovered in Medieval Europe whereby a broad peasant substratum organized in a great variety of different "tribal" units was linked to the political and cultural centers of the kings through an intermediary elite who functioned on two levels simultaneously. On the one hand, they exercised authority within ethnically differentiated regional units politically united by the kingdom. On the other, they participated in a social system centering around the king and his retainers, and representing not only politically but also socially and culturally a unit of a higher order, a "nation." (Cf. Francis, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-104, 203).

¹¹ Better education not only enables a man to perform key roles in a modern national society but also to assume leadership in the on-going process of homogenizing and modernizing society, which we have seen to be requisite of and concomitant with nation-building.

ing in them a sense of common purpose and organizing them into political action groups. This was a rather straightforward proposition as long as Colonial domination provided a common enemy and a common goal, and insofar as primarily urban masses were concerned. The problem of how to integrate the tribal population into the emerging nation, however, remained largely unsolved.

If the aims of demotic nationalism were to be realized, modernization had to be pushed far into the rural hinterland in order to weaken tribal authority, to soften tribal structures and to incorporate mobilized tribal members directly into a homogenized national society. "Tribalism" became the main challenge to nation-building. It is not confined to the resistance of politically organized tribes and their chiefs to pressures exerted by non-tribal elites and a central national government, but has also a definitely ethnic root. Just as rural migrants to European and American cities were drawn together by a new awareness of ethnic affinity to form segregated ethnic communities,¹² so among the members of different African tribes, who gathered in Colonial urban centres, linguistic and cultural affinities assumed a hitherto unrealized social significance. The pressures experienced as a consequence of rapid social change due to colonialism not only in urban centers but also in the tribal hinterland led to a general restlessness and dissatisfaction, to vague expectations and to a readiness to accept new thought patterns and novel types of social organization. This orientation was provided by leaders and action groups who interpreted a common situation in terms of common ethnicity. To become activated, however, an ethnos needs not only leadership but also some kind of organization through which it can express itself: a trade union, a political party, a church or a "tribal" society (*association d'originaires*) such as the Ashanti Youth Movement or the Yoruba Action Group.

¹² The formation of secondary ethnic groups, has been analyzed by this author, *op. cit.*, chap. 4; for an earlier English version see his "Variables in the Formation of So-called 'Minority Groups,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, 60 (1954), pp. 6-14.

TRIBALISM AND RACISM
AS ETHNIC NATIONALISMS

What goes by the name of tribalism refers as much to the new ethnic structures as to the politically organized tribes of history. Tribalist ideology aims not simply at the revival of past patterns of social organization but, at least in large part, at their reconstruction in the setting of nation-states and at their adaptation to modern conditions. In this respect African tribalism offers parallels to the restorative and ethnic types of nationalism which we have met in Europe. It, too, finds expression in regional and secessionist counter-movements against the homogenizing and centralist tendencies of demotic nationalism. Thus the ethnic factor becomes relevant to African politics in several different ways.

First of all, in the struggle for supremacy within a given nation-state, opposing leaders and action groups look for popular support to the ethnos to which they themselves belong. Their appeal to ethnic solidarity is apt to release powerful moral and emotional forces for goals which need not have any particular relevance to specifically ethnic interests. Such goals may bear upon pure power aspirations, upon economic reforms or upon the realization of a variety of cultural values which actually concern the totality of the nation-state. What counts is that they are rationalized and legitimized in ethnic terms. Some of the most important national movements and parties in contemporary Africa lean heavily on one ethnos, large in numbers and resources, or on a coalition of ethnic societies, even if their political concepts and programs eventually involve overcoming ethnic differences and building a homogeneous national society. Accordingly, ethnicity is temporarily utilized as a social force preparing mobilized tribal folk for direct participation in the demos. Ethnic groupings and *associations d'originaires* serve as intermediary powers fulfilling functions which super-ethnic organizations such as parties and trade unions, or the demotically-oriented institutions of the nation-state, cannot as yet undertake effectively. While within the framework of demotic nationalism the nucleus of the emerging nation is formed by Colonial society, it is strong, politically organized tribes, ex-

tended ethnic societies and their formal organizations which in other cases are visualized as the foundation of a nation. Promoters of ethnic nationalism use the ethnic factor not just as a subsidiary and temporary element but as the principal vehicle of nation-building. Sometimes native kingdoms and feudal structures still in existence, or even just memories of such political units now submerged, provide ethnic nationalism with rallying points and impressive symbols, and give rise to typically restorative tendencies and interpretations.

Finally, *Pan-Africanism* requires our attention. Among its numerous varieties, what may be called more correctly "Pan-Melanism" is of particular interest. It stresses the essential oneness of all those descended from the aboriginal peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, as manifested by common racial features which distinguish them from all other populations in significant contact with them. As we know, Pan-Africanism antedates other types of African nationalism. It developed under the impact of the American Negro movement, American Negro churches and the messianic mission assigned by American leaders to the whole black race.¹³ The notion that race was a relevant criterion for social differentiation, however, originated with the Europeans. The distinction between black and white as significant social categories was learned by both sub-Saharan Africans and American Negroes through the incessant and grim experience of race prejudice and discrimination; it has been accepted by them for the purpose of self-identification in order to cope with situations imposed upon them by the Europeans and their Colonial kin. Race has become a social reality because people actually orient their social actions in accordance with racial criteria.

In this respect Pan-Africanism bears a close resemblance to ethnic nationalism.¹⁴ Just as an ethnic society draws together several tribal and subtribal units into a larger whole, race assumes the character of a super-ethnos which

¹³ With regard to the "American roots" of Pan-Africanism see also Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), esp. chap. 1.

¹⁴ The same can be said of Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism.

embraces all the ethnic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, and paves the way for a national union on a continental scale. Race no less than ethnicity signifies in the last analysis a social relatedness based on common descent. Conspicuous somatic appearances may serve as a proof of common origin just as well as, if not better than, linguistic or cultural affinities. Pan-Africanism, as a variety of ethnic nationalism, recommends itself to nationalist leaders and action groups not only as a remedy for the difficulties with which demotic nation-building has to cope, and as an antidote against the disruptive forces of tribalism. The idea of the whole African race being a single ethnos with a legitimate claim to solidarity and eventually to political union has a particular appeal also in view of technological and economic development requiring the integration of very large territories.

CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES

A last question which should be asked concerns the variables contributing to the *saliency of the ethnic factor in national ideology and policy*. In the following, a few empirical generalizations are suggested on the basis of both African and European experiences.

1. Tribal elites, having a stake in the preservation of the status quo, are most likely to uphold ethnic values, and to legitimize their authority in ethnic terms, when challenged by non-tribal elites and by the institutions of the nation-state. To the extent that they resist modernization they also reject nationalism.

2. Non-tribal (educated) elites are likely to split over the issue of what role ethnicity should play in nation-building.

A. Political leaders who identify themselves with an existing state, and who seek to maintain political control, are most likely to embrace demotic nationalism and to reject tribalism or other forms of nationalism (Westernizing elite).

B. Other leaders seek modernization within the framework of traditional ethnic societies. They try to replace the tribal elite but seek legitimation of their own authority in ethnic terms. Their nationalism is likely to assume ethnic, restorative, regionalistic or even separatistic forms (traditionalist elite).

C. A third type of educated leader tries to strike a balance between demotic and ethnic nationalism. Their immediate goal is the transformation of the state population into a demotic nation. In this, and in their attempt to harness tribal and ethnic forces for the purpose of gaining wide popular support, they lean heavily toward revolutionary concepts and methods. In order to meet the difficulties immanent in nation-building, they tend to set ulterior goals in keeping with the Pan-African type of ethnic nationalism (revolutionary elite).

3. A ruling or dominant elite is less likely to legitimize its claim to power in ethnic terms than an elite in opposition, (a) unless one ethnic society is clearly identified with the state and strong enough in numbers and resources to maintain ascendancy over other ethnic societies included in the state; or (b) unless the state population is ethnically homogeneous. As a rule, this homogeneity can be achieved only if the transitional stage (of either absolutism or colonialism) has lasted long enough to assure the homogenizing effect of bureaucratic administration. The solidarity of a demotic nation can be strengthened by subsequently reinterpreting it in ethnic terms.

4. An elite in opposition is more likely to legitimize its claim to power in ethnic terms (a) if one ethnic society is represented disproportionately in the ruling elite; (b) if a disadvantaged section of the state population can clearly be distinguished from the dominant section by using ethnic criteria; (c) if the elite in opposition can identify itself with an elite formerly ruling in a territory which has lost its political independence and has become submerged in the nation-state.

5. An educated elite identified with a particular ethnic society is likely to oppose the centralizing and homogenizing tendencies of the ruling national elite on ethnic grounds, if

the tribal elite identified with the same ethnic society admits members of the educated elite to key positions in sub-national (regional) institutions and to the ranks of the tribal elite itself.

6. The saliency of the ethnic factor tends to increase: (a) the lesser the degree of social mobilization; (b) the less evenly economic opportunities and levels of education are distributed over the ethnic subunits of the state population; (c) the less evenly key positions in national institutions are manned by members of the different ethnic societies included in the nation state; (d) the greater the competition between different educational systems due to the lack of a uniform state-controlled system, or due to the fact that, side by side with a national system of education, there exist other educational systems linked to particular ethnic societies through a common religion, the use of a common literary language, or in some other way; (e) the lesser the degree to which one *lingua franca* is known and used throughout the nation.

7. If a state or several states, within their present boundaries and with their present ethnic composition, lack viability or are threatened from the outside, political leaders will be inclined to advocate a change of state boundaries. The ethnic factor may then be activated in two ways: (a) if an ethnic territory is divided among several states, and if the ethnos appears to be more privileged in one of them than in others, leaders may favor a change of state boundaries according to ethnic criteria so as to assure a maximum of advantages to all parts of the ethnos; (b) if inside and outside pressures suggest the cooperation, federation or amalgamation of several existing states, legitimation is likely to be sought in terms of an ethnic nationalism along Pan-African racial lines.